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Terrorism and Intelligence Legislation You Should Know About But Don’t

Now that this NSA story has spawned the insane amount of nonsensical and baseless conjecture on my Twitter feed, I thought I’d take a moment and educate everyone on intelligence and terrorism legislation they should already know about but don’t for various reasons.

Terrorism:
Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989Executive Order 12947 signed by President Bill Clinton Jan. 23, 1995, Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, and later expanded to include freezing the assets of Osama bin Laden and others.Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995US Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (see also the LaGrand case which opposed in 1999-2001 Germany to the US in the International Court of Justice concerning a German citizen convicted of armed robbery and murder, and sentenced to death)Executive Order 13224, signed by President George W. Bush Sept. 23, 2001, among other things, authorizes the seizure of assets of organizations or individuals designated by the Secretary of the Treasury to assist, sponsor, or provide material or financial support or who are otherwise associated with terrorists. 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).2001 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools for Intercepting and Obstructing Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act)(amended March 2006) (the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act was integrated to it) – I don’t have enough energy to discuss the Patriot Act. All you need to know is that it gives the US government very broad powers in order to combat terrorism.Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296.Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act (SAFETY Act) of 2002REAL ID Act of 2005 – Perhaps one of the most controversial pieces of legislation from the Bush era, it set forth certain requirements for state driver’s licenses and ID cards to be accepted by the federal government for “official purposes”, as defined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. It also outlines the following: Title II of the act establishes new federal standards for state-issued driver licenses and non-driver identification cards.Changing visa limits for temporary workers, nurses, and Australian citizens.Funding some reports and pilot projects related to border security.Introducing rules covering “delivery bonds” (similar to bail bonds but for aliens who have been released pending hearings).Updating and tightening the laws on application for asylum and deportation of aliens for terrorist activity.Waiving laws that interfere with construction of physical barriers at the bordersAnimal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 – The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) prohibits any person from engaging in certain conduct “for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise.” and extends to any act that either “damages or causes the loss of any real or personal property” or “places a person in reasonable fear” of injury. Military Commissions Act of 2006 – The United States Military Commissions Act of 2006, also known as HR-6166, was an Act of Congress signed by President George W. Bush on October 17, 2006. The Act’s stated purpose was “To authorize trial by military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other purposes.” It was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2008 but parts remain in order to use commissions to prosecute war crimes.National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 – The second most controversial piece of legislation from the War on Terror authorizes “the President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in subsection (b)) pending disposition under the law of war.
(b) Covered Persons- A covered person under this section is any person as follows:
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks.
(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.
(c) Disposition Under Law of War- The disposition of a person under the law of war as described in subsection (a) may include the following:
(1) Detention under the law of war without trial until the end of the hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force.
(2) Trial under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (title XVIII of Public Law 111-84)).
(3) Transfer for trial by an alternative court or competent tribunal having lawful jurisdiction.
(4) Transfer to the custody or control of the person’s country of origin, any other foreign country, or any other foreign entity.
(d) Construction- Nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force.
(e) Authorities- Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United States.
(f) Requirement for Briefings of Congress- The Secretary of Defense shall regularly brief Congress regarding the application of the authority described in this section, including the organizations, entities, and individuals considered to be ‘covered persons’ for purposes of subsection (b)(2).Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 requires all federal and state agencies establish response protocols for critical domestic incidents in line with the National Incident Management System.
Intelligence
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is perhaps the most interesting and secretive of laws we have. It was enacted to combat the threat of foreign intelligence services through surveillance activities abroad and at home. It allows these broad surveillance powers to be used against foreign and domestic agents. In other words, it authorizes our government to spy on its citizens if it believes they present a credible national security threat. FISA warrants are granted by secret courts that exist solely for approving FISA warrants. Note: I said “approving” as in for every warrant the DoJ has ever applied for, they have gotten it. Nowhere else in our judicial system do such powers exist.Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 enacted several of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. It established the the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.18 USC § 798 – Disclosure of classified information – Criminalizes the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.50 USC § 421 – Protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources – Think Valerie Plame.

Emotional Regulation and Supression

 The British Psychological Society reports on how people regulate their emotions.

They report that according to new research published in the journal Emotion, a person’s ability to regulate or not regulate their emotions has a big impact on the level of anxiety they feel.

This new research purports that individuals who adopt an emotional regulation strategy called reappraisal often suffer from less general and social anxiety than those who fail to express their feelings openly.

Nicole Llewellyn, a graduate student from the University of Illinois, explained the reappraisal strategy as one that sees people thinking about things in a more positive light, adding: “You sort of re-frame and reappraise what’s happened and think what are the positives about this?“  Individuals who follow this approach will often consider how an issue can be a seen as a stimulating challenge as opposed to a problem.

FarsNews.com reports on a related study, conducted by British researchers, that shows that different brain areas are activated when we choose to suppress an emotion compared to when we are instructed to inhibit an emotion.

Dr. Simone Kuhn of Ghent University and colleagues scanned the brains of healthy participants and found that key brain systems were activated when choosing to suppress an emotion. They had previously linked this brain area to deciding to inhibit movement.

“This result shows that emotional self-control involves a quite different brain system from simply being told how to respond emotionally,” Kuhn, the lead author, reported.

He went on to note, “We should distinguish between voluntary and instructed control of emotions, in the same way as we can distinguish between making up our own mind about what do, versus following instructions.”

This study published in Brain Structure and Function had fifteen healthy women view unpleasant or frightening pictures. The participants were given a choice to feel the emotion elicited by the image, or alternatively to inhibit the emotion, by distancing themselves through an act of self-control.

The researchers further delineated, “Most studies of emotion processing in the brain simply assume that people passively receive emotional stimuli, and automatically feel the corresponding emotion. In contrast, the area we have identified may contribute to some individuals’ ability to rise above particular emotional situations.”

 What are Your Thoughts on this new Emotion Regulation Information?

The Hot Hands Fallacy

Back in April – in our Exploring Unpredictable Social Strategies post – we told you that the best way to control your subordinates (if you have any) was to reward them randomly when they do something you like.  We explained:

“Each time your rewardees perform a desirable action, flip a coin. If heads, reward it; if tails, ignore it. When the coin generates a long ‘ignore’ streak, your respondent should perform the action over and over again with ever-increasing rapidity and urgency, expecting to be rewarded more and more each time he or she isn’t. This is the gambler’s fallacy at work.”

If you don’t remember, the gambler’s fallacy is a flaw in probabilistic reasoning that causes most people to mistrust long streaks in randomly generated events.  The fallacy gets its name from a common mistake gambler’s make when betting on roulette and slots.  When a roulette wheel has a black streak, players will bet increasingly larger sums of money on red because they think the black streak is more likely to end the longer it continues.  When a slot machine fails to pay out, players will crank the lever faster and faster, depositing money with each pull, because they believe their losing streak will end soon.  In both cases, they’re wrong; random events are always unpredictable.  They’re always as likely to win as they are to continue losing.

If you have the power to give out or withhold rewards, then you should do so using behavioral psychology’s equivalent of the slot machine: the random ratio reward schedule.  This is as easy as requiring your rewardees to “win” a coin toss each time they do something you like before receiving their reward.  Just like the gamblers, they will continue to work harder for your approval if they can’t predict when they will be rewarded.  However, we also supposed that this simple system may not work under certain conditions.  In this post, we’ll show you what those conditions could be.

But first, another fallacy.

The Hot Hands Fallacy

When Amos Tversky’s name appears at the top of a study, there’s a strong chance something you believe will be challenged.  If you like basketball, then the 1985 study he co-authored with Thomas Gilovich (Cornell University) and Robert Vallone (Stanford University) will debunk a common belief you may hold about the game: that some players go on hot or cold scoring “streaks.”  To Tversky, one of the most famous contemporary psychologists (second only to his close friend and colleague Daniel Kahneman; both specialize in cognitive psychology), this sounded like a fallacy.  After all, he and Kahneman documented the existence of the gambler’s fallacy over a decade earlier; he of all people would know flawed reasoning when he saw it.  So he, Gilovich, and Vallone took data from the 1980-81 Philadelphia 76ers’ home games and looked for evidence of streak scoring.

They found none.  Contrary to what 91% of surveyed basketball fans at Cornell and Stanford believed, no player was more likely to score on his second field goal attempt if he had scored on his first attempt, nor was he more likely to score on his third attempt if he had on his first two, and so on.

In case extraneous variables (defensive pressure and shot selection) were contaminating their findings, the authors analyzed free throw data from the Boston Celtics’ 1980-1981 and 1981-1982 seasons.  Did any player’s first free throw attempt affect his second free throw attempt?

No.

Next, the authors set up a controlled shooting test with 26 Cornell players (14 men, 12 women) to eliminate extraneous variables.  Each player shot from a distance at which his or her shooting percentage was 50 percent.  An arc was drawn on the court after this distance was determined, and each player shot once from different points along the arc.  To incentivize accuracy and assess players’ predictions, the players placed high or low bets on each successive shot and were paid a few cents when they scored and were docked a few cents if they missed.

Did statistical streaks appear for players in this part of the study?

No.

Did the players accurately predict their hits and misses?

No; they predicted streaks, though, whenever they made or missed shots successively.

Finally, the authors surveyed the student fans at Cornell and Stanford again to see how well they could interpret basketball data.  Each student was shown six sequences of X’s and O’s (intended to represent hits and misses, respectively) and were asked to indicate which sequences were streaks and which were random.  How did they do?

Terribly.  Only about 30 percent correctly identified the random sequences as random.  About 60 percent believed the random sequences were actually streaks.  And about 70 percent believed that alternating sequences (in other words, streaks of successive hits followed immediately by misses; for example, XOXO) were actually random.  The authors guessed that the reason the students did so poorly on this last test is because they expected repeating outcomes to continue repeating.  In the alternating sequence, the shots did not repeat, and the students saw it as random.  In the random sequences, hits and misses occasionally do repeat, and the students saw them as streaks.  Taken together, these mistakes – seeing streaks in random data where they don’t exist and misinterpreting alternating streaks as random – are called the Hot Hands Fallacy.

The Other Side of the Coin

If you’ve made it this far, you should now be asking yourself why these people did the exact opposite of what gamblers do.  And if you’re really astute, you’ll notice that the Cornell players in the controlled shooting test were gambling on their own attempts, betting that their ‘hot streaks’ and ‘cold streaks’ would continue, not end.

Why aren’t they committing the gambler’s fallacy?

Unfortunately, we don’t know for sure, mainly because no one has tried to find out.  The original Gilovich/Vallone/Tversky study we just examined (known as “GVT” in psychology circles) kicked off a 20-year-long sports argument.  Researches replicated GVT’s basketball studies, taking into account more and more minute variables into their analyses.  Other researchers went into baseball, tennis, golf, mini-golf, darts, bowling, and horseshoes.  We found hardly a study looking for what we were looking for; the mental processes that cause people to commit the fallacy – mental processes that could be exploited.

And then we found Alter and Oppenheimer, 2006.  It’s not a study; it’s a review of the all the work done by cognitive psychologists on the hot hands fallacy since GVT.  Based on their reviews, the authors make this claim:

“…when people assume that a process is random, they expect a more rapid alternation between outcomes than stochastic [randomly determined] modelling would suggest (Falk & Konold, 1997)…Whereas people expect coin tosses to be random, they are willing to entertain the possibility that streaky performance in a human-driven domain like basketball implies a degree of skill…once people decide that a basketball player has violated the assumptions of randomness, his skill is attributed to a ‘hot hand.’” (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006).

Is this true? If yes, then we must update the advice we gave you back in April.  Yes, continue rewarding your underlings randomly using the coin-toss approach (or any other random method of your choosing).  But make sure they know what’s going on.  If they know they’re being rewarded randomly, they will commit the gambler’s fallacy as planned.  But if they are blind to the process, they’ll give you trouble; each time you repeatedly reward them (heads followed by heads followed by heads, etc.), they will expect you to continue this reward “streak” and will work less hard or more slowly.  The same applies if you repeatedly ignore them (tails followed by tails followed by tails, etc.); they’ll just assume you’re done being generous.  Don’t fall into these traps; inform them that it’s random, and you’ll keep them busy and compliant.

Or so we think.  We still have work to do on this because Alter’s and Oppenheimer’s theory needs hard evidence.  But for now, just to be safe, we’ll take it at face-value.  Make sure your minions know that the coin, not you, is calling the shots.

Sources

Gilovich, T., et al. (1985). The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 295-314.
Alter, A.L., and Oppenheimer, D.M. (2006). From a fixation on sports to an exploration of mechanism: The past, present, and future of hot hand research. Thinking and Reasoning, 12(4), 431-444.

Next Post in Series: Unpredictability: Hot Hands vs. Gambler’s Fallacies