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The Humintell Blog July 13, 2013

Mapping Emotions

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Courtesy of StockVault

Emotions seem to play a role in most aspects of human interaction and life, yet scientists and philosophers still know relatively little about them.  New information on emotions is continuously evolving and Science Codex has reported on one of the newest theories on the science of Emotions.

This new theory, “the integrated embodiment theory of emotions”, is outlined in the journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.  It posits that emotions are formulated by the integration of different bodily perceptions that have representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs.  That is, emotions are not just representations of perception or thought but are separate mental states, which are a reflection of the integration of feelings of bodily processes and cognitive events.

Prof. Dr. Albert Newen and Dr. Luca Barlassina of the Institute of Philosophy II at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, are the creators of this new emotion theory and purport that their theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.

This theory labeled an impure somatic theory of emotions and is contrasted with current pure somatic theories that posit emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions.  Emotions are nothing but the perception of a bodily state.  That is we do not tremble because we are scared, but rather we are scared because we tremble.  “This theory does not, however, consider the cognitive content of many emotions“, says  Newen.

The “cognitive theory of emotions” says that emotions are essentially an assessment of the situation based on reason: this dog is dangerous because he is baring his teeth. “This theory is also unsatisfactory,” says Newen, “because it forgets the feelings as a central component of the emotion.“ For example, a person can judge that a dog is dangerous and at the same time have no fear because he is an expert in handling dangerous dogs. So the cognitive assessment does not necessarily determine the emotion.

According to Newen and Barlassina, the new theory is superior to Jesse Prinz’s most sophisticated theory of emotions so far, because this does not take into account that an emotion can also be directed at an object that is not present or does not even exist.

A related article from Science World Report purports that scientists may be able to tell exactly how a person feels by mapping their brain. For the first time, researchers have identified exactly which emotion a person is experiencing based solely on brain activity.

This study, published in PLOS One journal, claims to be different from others in that it does not rely on people to delineate their emotional state(s) (i.e. self-report).  It uses a computational model that identifies individuals’ thoughts of concrete objects.

Amanda Markey , one of the researchers, points out, “Despite manifest differences between people’s psychology, different people tend to neutrally encode emotions in remarkably similar ways.“

The researchers also found that emotion signatures aren’t necessarily limited to specific brain regions. Instead, they produce characteristics patterns throughout a number of brain regions.  In the future, the researchers plan to use this new identification method in order to overcome a number of challenging problems in emotion research, including identifying emotions that individuals are actively trying to suppress.

 Is this new theory of emotions being separate mental states superior to the old?

Filed Under: Hot Spots, Nonverbal Behavior, Science

The Humintell Blog July 11, 2013

Dr. Matsumoto’s Radio Interview – “View Point” with Ellen Shehadeh

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Photo courtesy of StockVault

Listen to Humintell director’s radio interview on facial expressions, emotions, & culture on 90.5 FM’s “View Point” with Ellen Shehadeh.

“Faces are special because they communicate specific information about our emotional states as well as sometimes our thoughts and our feelings,“ Dr. Matsumoto pointed out.

He comments on an investigators duty when trying to evaluate truthfulness:

“That’s why being able to read microexpressions as well as all the other non-verbal as well as the verbal indicators are aids for an investigator to then follow-up because the follow-up and how you follow-up and what you’re gonna say and the content that you’re gonna explore whether you’re an investigator or psychotherapist or physician, or lawyer that’s the other very important half of the equation of being able to use these kinds of indicators.“

He goes on to talk about the difference between micro and macro facial expressions specifically the microexpression of fear:

“Now having said that [quote above] I believe that the dynamics of the expressions are gonna be different.  For example if you’re walking into an airport and you’re showing fear, you could be afraid of being caught because you’re carrying some contraband…or you could be afraid of the fact that you forgot where you parked your car or whether you turned off your lights in the garage…so the fact that you’re afraid doesn’t tell you which one that is [what reason you are displaying fear for], but I do believe that if you’re afraid of being caught you’re gonna be more likely to hide your fear. Whereas if you’re afraid that you forgot to turn off the lights in your car you’re not gonna be that afraid of wanting to hide that [type of] fear.  So, the fear is gonna look different and that’s the difference between micro expressions [trying to conceal the fact that you are afraid] and macro expressions…“

 For more information or to listen to the entire interview visit KWMR 90.5 FM.

Filed Under: Hot Spots, Nonverbal Behavior, Science

Practical Persuasion Blog July 9, 2013

Unpredictability: Hot Hands vs. Gambler’s Fallacies

We knew before starting this blog that few others are interested in making persuasive psychology practical.  It’s frustrating, but it forces us to research carefully and it ensures our ideas are new and potentially useful, not exhaustively re-hashed impractical nonsense or indecipherable jargon-laced dissertations.  The dearth of information about every-day, real-world, common-man influence strategies is a blessing and curse; we’re doing what few have done before, but few are there to help us do it.

Last week, though, we got help.

In our post Exploring Unpredictable Social Strategies, we made a bold claim: we said that the best way to control your subordinates is to reward them randomly when they do something you like, and that no other method would produce the same results.  We based our claim on solid evidence that random ratio reward schedules induce compliance by trapping reward-seekers in a common probabilistic error called the gambler’s fallacy.  After that, we introduced you to the hot hands fallacy, and advised you to be open with your subordinates about the process, lest they commit this error – the wrong error.  The advice was an even bigger leap than our previous claim because we didn’t have – and didn’t expect to find – a study comparing the relative effects of each kind of fallacy.  The concept was just too new.  So we were surprised last week when we found one with this subtitle: “The hot hand versus the gambler’s fallacy.”  Rarely does a search turn up results like that; we eagerly read it.

The study turned out to be better than we could have hoped.  Not only did it address the same question we were asking ourselves, it did so by experimenting with the same random process (coin-tossing) we’d been using as an example, and its findings suggest we were right: random ratio reward schedules work best if everyone knows that the process, not you, determines who wins and who loses.

The Study

Canadian researchers Christopher J. R. Roney and Lana M. Trick wanted to identify the cognitive mechanics behind the gambler’s and hot hands fallacies.  Because the fallacies predict different outcomes and assume different processes, each one should only occur in mutually exclusive situations.  When outcomes are genuinely random, everyone should be committing the gambler’s fallacy.  When outcomes are plausibly skills-based or are possibly rigged, everyone should be committing the hot hands fallacy.  But have you ever heard someone claim they’re “on a roll” after they win twice or three times in a row?  Of course you have.  Have you ever seen a gambler who’s unable to quit while he or she is ahead?  Hopefully not, but perhaps.  Do you know someone who picks their own “lucky” lottery numbers every week?  More than likely.  In all these examples, the person is committing the hot hands fallacy even though the game is random.  Why?

Roney and Trick hypothesized that the cognitive mechanics involved in each of these fallacies activate or deactivate whenever someone’s beliefs about a process’s outcomes change.  If a person believes he or she or some other human being is somehow skillfully controlling outcomes previously believed to be merely random, then the person should switch from using the gambler’s fallacy to using the hot hands fallacy.  For coin-tossing, it would look like this: changing a person’s focus from the random nature of the coin to the real or imagined skills of the coin-tosser should induce a switch in fallacies.

Testing this theory was incredibly simple.  The experiments involved 124 undergrads (the subjects) watching one of two women flip a coin. In the experimental conditions, one woman would flip seven times, and lie about what came up such that the results were always either HTHTTTT or THTHHHH (alternation followed by repetition).  The subjects would bet on the next outcome each time and record their confidence in the bet.  Before the eighth flip, though, the woman would say one of two lines: “Wow, I’m really throwing a lot of [heads or tails],” or, “Wow, this coin is really coming up with lot of [heads or tails].”  (In the control condition, these lines were not said.)  Then, the woman either kept flipping or handed the coin off to the second woman (who, ostensibly, was there to record the “results.”)  You can see that depending on which of the two phrases was said in between the seventh and eight flips that the researchers intended to re-focus the subject’s attention, changing it ever so slightly toward the woman’s “skill” (the first phrase), or even more intently on the coin (the second phrase).  The researchers also predicted that when the coin changed hands, the gambler’s fallacy would remain in effect regardless of which phrase preceded the eighth flip.

They were mostly right.  As expected, nearly all of the control subjects committed the gambler’s fallacy and predicted the streaks to end on the eighth flip. And, as expected, when the coin changed hands, the gambler’s fallacy was predominant in all cases.  But just a small majority of the subjects who’d heard the first phrase committed the hot hands fallacy and guessed that the repetition would continue.  Something similar happened to the subjects who’d heard the second phrase: about half of them committed the hot hands fallacy, probably because the wording of the second phrase led them to believe the coin itself was biased or “charmed.”

The most revealing data, however, are the confidence scores of the bets placed by the subjects.  Overall, those who committed the hot hands fallacy in the first experimental condition were much more confident in their bets on the outcome of the eighth flip than those who stuck with the gambler’s fallacy.  The highest confidence in bets on reversals, of course, occurred in the control condition.

So, what does this mean for our reward system?  Well, if you keep your method secret from those you want to control, you might lose about half of your rewardees to the hot hands fallacy; once you hit a streak, half of them will expect it to continue, and those who don’t won’t hesitate to change their minds if it does continue.  In other words, they’ll stop trying.  Keep it transparent, though, and they will stay busy doing what you want them to.

Damage Control

Let’s say you’re the supervisor of a group of employees (assembly-line workers, for instance.)  You want your workers to be more efficient because your superiors are worried about their bottom-line.  You remember from business school that incentives are a good way to achieve this goal, but your workers are already well-paid and enjoy several generous benefit packages, so you’re at a loss for how to incentivize them more.  That night, after work, you read on Practical Persuasion that a random-ratio reward system based on a coin-toss is the best way to induce compliance.  The next morning, you call your team together and tell them that each day of the month, whoever is 95 percent productive or better could get $100 cash.  You don’t tell them that the result is determined randomly because you’re afraid they won’t play along.

For two weeks, your employees operate at break-neck speed. Efficiency is consistently in the 80s and 90s, even on Fridays.  A third of your employees are 90 percent productive or higher.  As you expected, about half of those get bonuses.  The money you saved the company on labor and utilities more than makes up for the extra cash.  The bosses sing your praises.

The next two weeks, though, are different.  Productivity flat-lines, and then drops back to previous levels.  You remind your workers that the productivity game is still on, but they don’t seem to care.  Only half of the original productivity all-stars from before make the cut this time.  The bosses suddenly can’t remember your name.

After two more weeks of low productivity, HR organizes a company-wide teamwork seminar that wastes even more time and money. You also have to meet for two hours with the 21-year-old economics major who the bosses hired on as a “business strategies consultant” (he gets paid twice as much as you do, by the way).  You’re pissed. You go home, get drunk, and resolve to expose those two bastards at Practical Persuasion for the frauds they really are.

We hope this doesn’t really happen to anyone.  If it does, don’t hit “send” on that angry email just yet.  We now know that when people aren’t aware that a game is random, they assume it’s rigged after seeing several successively repeating outcomes. Also, a bit more than half of them will be almost certain that it is so.  To get them back, try this: explain how your system works…and then secretly scrap it.  Purposefully alternate your responses for a while.  Many people often mistake these alternations for randomness, so intentionally switching back-and-forth like this should get most of the skeptics back on board.  Be sure to submit to the coin (or whatever random process you’re using) once you’re secure.

Sources

Roney, C. J. R., & Trick, L. M. (2009). Sympathetic magic and perceptions of randomness: The hot hand versus the gambler’s fallacy. Thinking and Reasoning, 15(2), 197 – 210.

Filed Under: Influence, unpredictability

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